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WHY THE CONGRESS WAS WRONG AND THE COURT WAS
RIGHT-REFLECTIONS ON CITY OF BOERNE v. FLORES
IRA C. LUPU*
Despite my occasional alliance with forces hostile to the Reli-
gious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA or the "Act"),' City of
Boerne v. Flores2 provoked me to mixed feelings. True enough, I
wagered a case of Montana beer on the outcome, and I thorough-
ly enjoyed my brewed reward.' Moreover, I did not leave the de-
cision in Flores entirely to chance and the exertions of others. I
happily provided Marci Hamilton, counsel for the City of Boerne,
with some suggestions along the way, and she in turn, was gen-
erous enough to moot her Supreme Court argument in front of a
group of my colleagues and seminar students at George Wash-
ington. One's victory, however, is always another's defeat, and
given my personal and professional connections to both sides, I
quickly began to feel pangs of sweet sorrow. After all, sunset for
RFRA meant darkness for religious liberty. Or did it? The more
I concerned myself with that question, the more my mood gave
way to genuine bemusement. As the spin accelerated in the af-
termath of Flores,4 I developed a sense that I had been a bit
* Louis Harkey Mayo Research Professor of Law, The George Washington Uni-
versity School of Law. Thanks to Jerry Barron, Tom Dienes, Marci Hamilton, Ren~e
Lettow, Mike Selmi, Jon Siegel, Bob Tuttle, and the participants in the GW Faculty
Workshop for helpful comments on an earlier version of this manuscript and to Julia
Morgan for excellent research assistance.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994).
2. 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
3. See infra note 17 for an account of the circumstances of the wager.
4. See, e.g., Protecting Religious Freedom After Boerne v. Flores: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong.
(1997) [hereinafter Flores Hearings] (witness statements) (visited Sept. 23, 1997)
<http/www.house.govjudiciary/222307.htm>. The witnesses, who included Professors
Douglas Laycock of the University of Texas Law School and Thomas Berg of
Cumberland School of Law at Samford University, adamantly criticized the Flores
decision but offered few examples of any concrete accomplishments of RFRA that
would be unachievable without it. See id. (testimony of Prof. Douglas Laycock); id.
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player in, and active witness to, a contemporary constitutional
pseudotragedy.
This Essay proceeds in three parts. The first part chronicles
my place and that of others in commentary, prediction, and pro-
fessional efforts concerning the constitutionality of RFRA. Con-
trary to what many of its proponents believed, RFRA was
doomed from the start. The second part analyzes the reasons for
my ambivalence about RFRA. In short, I believe that Employ-
ment Division v. Smith' is a bad decision, but I also believe that
Congress erred in trying to correct Smith by legislation. More-
over, this second part explains why I think that the presence or
absence of RFRA, or some potential RFRA substitute, will have
few practical consequences for religious liberty. Far more than
its proponents are likely to admit, RFRA has been a failure. The
third part turns to the grand and overarching question present-
ed by application of RFRA to the states. Rarely does Marbury v.
Madison6 come face-to-face with McCulloch v. Maryland, but
this showdown occurred in Flores. Although Marbury and
McCulloch are not ordinarily in explicit tension, exercise of con-
gressional power under the Fourteenth Amendment offers the
distinct possibility of such conflict. In Mores, the Court identi-
fied and resolved that struggle in a way that demonstrated fidel-
ity to longstanding attributes of constitutional structure.
(testimony of Prof. Thomas Berg). For other commentaries on Flores, see Joan
Biskupic, Supreme Court Overturns Religious Freedom Statute, WASH. POST, June 26,
1997, at Al (quoting Rabbi David Saperstein, director of the Religious Action Center
of Reform Judaism, that the decision would "go down in history . . . among the
worst mistakes this court has ever made"); Nathan Lewin, It's Time for a Religious
Freedom Amendment, WASH. POST, July 3, 1997, at A19 (calling for a constitutional
amendment, with operative terms virtually identical to those in RFRA, to overturn
Flores); Robert Marquand, High Court Clips Protection for Religious Freedom in US,
CHRISTIAN SC. MONITOR, June 26, 1997, at 1, 18 (quoting statement of the Baptist
Joint Committee on Public Affairs that the Supreme Court "nullified . . . the most
important piece of legislation affecting our religious liberty since the First Amend-
ment itself .... Our First Freedom' is not only no longer first, it is barely a free-
dom at all.").
5. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
6. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
7. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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I. WE TOLD You So
Much as I know about the fall that follows pride, I cannot re-
sist claiming some credit for being out front on this one. I ex-
pressed doubt about the constitutionality of RFRA the way Chi-
cagoans were once reputed to vote-early and often. Congress-
man Solarz originally proposed RFRA in 1990,' in the immedi-
ate wake of Smith. In early 1992, while the Act was pending in
Congress, I wrote an article asserting that RFRA, as applied to
the states, was unlikely to survive Supreme Court review.9 I
.repeated that assertion in testimony on May 14, 1992, before the
Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House
Judiciary Committee.0
RFRA became law in the fall of 1993." I must confess that
by the time I prepared my submission to the Montana Law Re-
view symposium on RFRA,"2 held in the fall of 1994, I had be-
gun to hedge. A number of my friends in the community of reli-
gious liberty advocates were involved deeply in the passage of
RFRA, and I was not entirely comfortable trashing their handi-
work. Less personally and more substantively, I thought that
the Court had decided Smith incorrectly and that the decision
was a worthy candidate for prompt reconsideration. Consequent-
8. See H.R. 5377, 101st Cong. (1990).
9. See Ira C. Lupu, Statutes Revolving in Constitutional Law Orbits, 79 VA. L.
REv. 1, 52-62 (1993). At the time the article was prepared, Congress was considering
the proposed Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1991, H.R. 2797, 102d Cong.
(1991). The text of that version of RFRA, which is not materially different for pur-
poses of constitutional analysis from the version Congress enacted in 1993, is re-
printed in an appendix to the article. See Lupu, supra, at 87-89.
10. See The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1991: Hearings on H.R. 2797 Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 102d Cong. 385-94 (1992) [hereinafter 1992 RFRA Hearings] (statement of
Professor Ira C. Lupu). At the time I gave that testimony, I had the distinct sense
that Subcommittee Chairman Don Edwards (D-Cal.) had not heard that side of the
story, and the even deeper sense that the interest groups backing RFRA did not
want that side aired.
11. President Clinton signed RFRA into law on November 16, 1993. See Peter
Steinfels, Clinton Signs Law Protecting Religious Practices, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16,
1993, at A18.
12. The writings that emerged from the symposium can be found in The James R.
Browning Symposium for 1994: The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 56 MoNT. L.
REV. 1 (1995).
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ly, my symposium contribution restated my constitutional
doubts about RFRAI but suggested a narrowing construction
that might save it. In particular, I argued that courts should
construe the Act as having erased Smith and having returned
free exercise law to where it stood on the eve of Smith, rather
than to its high water mark of some twenty years before. 4
In the course of presenting that piece in various settings,
including the symposium itself, I realized that my diplomatic
middle ground was of interest to very few people. Supporters of
RFRA, including most prominently Professor Douglas Laycock,
argued strenuously in Congress and in academic literature that
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment ("Section 5 )5 fully
supported congressional power to enact RFRA.' For those indi-
viduals who were convinced of RFRA's constitutionality and who
endorsed its policy, a narrowing construction was both unneces-
sary and undesirable.
To opponents of RFRA, saving the Act in any form seemed ill-
advised. Dan Conkle wrote the best and most persuasive piece on
13. See Ira C. Lupu, Of Time and the RFRA: A Lawyer's Guide to the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, 56 MONT. L. REV. 171, 212-18 (1995).
14. See id. at 219-25. The Act's language is far more consistent with a "high wa-
ter mark" interpretation than with an "eve of Smith" interpretation.
15. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
16. See 1992 RFRA Hearings, supra note 10, at 353-59 (statement of Professor
Douglas Laycock); Douglas Laycock, RFRA, Congress, and the Ratchet, 56 MoNT. L.
REV. 145 (1995); see also Bonnie I. Robin-Vergeer, Disposing of the Red Herrings: A
Defense of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 589 (1996) (de-
fending RFRA's constitutionality and arguing for a broad interpretation of Congress's
authority to enforce the Civil War Amendments); Matt Pawa, Comment, When the
Supreme Court Restricts Constitutional Rights, Can Congress Save Us?: An Exami-
nation of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1029, 1095-99
(1993) (arguing that Congress has broad power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment and that RFRA falls within that power).
17. Indeed, on the final morning of the symposium at Montana, Mike Paulsen
found all of the anti-RFRA constitutional arguments so flawed that he declared a
willingness to wager a case of Montana beer on the outcome of a Supreme Court
test of RFRA. Although several others in the crowd shared my sentiments, I alone
was sufficiently impulsive to take the bet. As it turned out, Mike could not find a
case of any Montana brewed beer in or around the District of Columbia, so I gra-
ciously permitted him to substitute a collection of fine microbrewery products as a
payoff. For the month of July, I alternated among Cells Pale Ale, Devil Mountain
Five Malt Ale, Pete's Summer Brew, and Samuel Adam's Golden Pilsner while
thinking about how wise the Supreme Court is.
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why Congress's power under Section 5 could not sustain RFRA.'8
Professor Conkle's work provides an analytical framework with
which the Supreme Court opinion coincides considerably."9 Bill
Marshall, concerned that RFRA unconstitutionally favored reli-
gion, comprehensively analyzed nonestablishment, equal protec-
tion and free speech issues presented by the Act.20 Marci Hamil-
ton, who so effectively represented the City of Boerne in the Su-
preme Court, also penned a powerful attack on the statute. Her
arguments, all of which found their way into her presentation to
the Court, included considerations of federalism, but went beyond
those considerations to encompass pure separation of powers and
nonestablishment principles.2 ' Joanne Brant authored the first
anti-RFRA piece based on separation-of-powers principles
alone,22 and Larry Sager and Chris Eisgruber followed with an
article that expanded the separation-of-powers critique.8 8 Jay
Bybee analyzed questions, from a historical perspective, about the
power of Congress to legislate under the Fourteenth Amendment
in the field of religion,' and Scott Idleman raised significant Es-
tablishment Clause issues as well as Section 5 concerns in his
commentary on RFRA.' Eugene Gressman and Angela Carmella
18. See Daniel 0. Conkle, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: The Constitu-
tional Significance of an Unconstitutional Statute, 56 MoNT. L. REv. 39 (1995).
19. What distinguished Flores most significantly from the Conkle article was the
opinion's thorough account of the history of Section 5. See City of Boerne v. Flores,
117 S. Ct. 2157, 2164-66 (1997). Conkle's article focused more on precedent, the doc-
trine it generates, and the rigorous application of that doctrine to RFRA. See
Conkle, supra note 18.
20. See William P. Marshall, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Establish-
ment, Equal Protection, and Free Speech Concerns, 56 MoNT. L. REv. 227 (1995).
21. See Marci A. Hamilton, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Letting the Fox
into the Henhouse Under Cover of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 16
CARDOZO L. REV. 357 (1994). The works of both Marci Hamilton and Douglas
Laycock are stunning examples of how to effectively combine distinguished academic
work and rigorous client advocacy.
22. See Joanne C. Brant, Taking the Supreme Court At Its Word: The Implications
for RFRA and Separation of Powers, 56 MONT. L. REv. 5 (1995).
23. See Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Why the Religious Free-
dom Restoration Act is Unconstitutional, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 437 (1994). Although the
Eisgruber-Sager piece is dated 1994, it appeared in mid-1995, several months after
the publication of the symposium at Montana.
24. See Jay S. Bybee, Taking Liberties with the First Amendment: Congress, Sec-
tion 5, and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1539 (1995).
25. See Scott C. Idleman, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Pushing the Lim-
1998] 797
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burnished these arguments with a thorough analysis of RFRA's
constitutional problems.26
Despite how surprised some of RFRA's supporters may have
been by Flores,27 plenty of RFRA opponents saw the handwrit-
ing on the wall in federalism cases beginning with New York v.
United States," and continuing though United States v.
Lopez29 and Seminole Tribe v. Florida.0 Those signs culminat-
ed in a dramatic series of pro-state federalism decisions, Flores
included, in the final days of the Court's 1996 term.3 ' Unless
the Fourteenth Amendment or some other explicit prohibition
withdraws state sovereignty to govern in a particular way, Con-
gress faces limits on its power to conscript state government and
its agents as instruments of federal policy. RFRA did that, and,
for reasons elaborated more fully in Part III below, the Court
would not allow it.
II. FLORES AS PSEUDO-TRAGEDY
Ever since the Supreme Court's 1990 decision in Smith, RFRA
proponents have asserted much and demonstrated little about
the threat to religious liberty in America. Douglas Laycock and
others testified about religious persecution in America at the
congressional hearings on RFRA, but they offered few examples
of what strikes ordinary people as oppression by the govern-
ment. 2 True oppression is aimed by the oppressors at the op-
pressed; when government so behaves towards religion, covertly
its of Legislative Power, 73 TEX. L. REv. 247 (1994).
26. See Eugene Gressman & Angela C. Carmella, The RFRA Revision of the Free
Exercise Clause, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 65 (1996). By the time Professor William Van
Alstyne published his piece about RFRA, The Failure of the Religious Freedom Resto-
ration Act under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 1996 DUKE L.J. 291, there was little
new to say.
27. See Steven G. Calabresi, A Constitutional Revolution, WALL ST. J., July 10,
1997, at A14 (commenting on liberal academic tendencies to discount considerations
of federalism).
28. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
29. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
30. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
31. In addition to Flores, see Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997), and
Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 117 S. Ct. 2028 (1997).
32. The Court in Flores cites and summarizes this testimony in Part IIIB. See
City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2169-72 (1997).
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or otherwise, the Free Exercise Clause forbids the action."3
RFRA is aimed at the more diffuse and larger set of problems-
arising from the incidental impact of formally religion-neutral
rules on religious practices or church activity. Such impacts may
be the product of insensitivity, lack of information, or
ethnocentrism;34 alternatively, they may simply reflect the cost
of doing religious business in a complex society.
The incidental impact of legal rules upon religion may occur
in many contexts. Prior to Flores, RFRA's most widespread ef-
fects were in state prisons. The religious liberties of prisoners
are regulated heavily, and prison inmates are notoriously liti-
gious.35 Not surprisingly, therefore, more than half of the re-
ported cases under RFRA involve prison inmates."6 Of course,
even outside of prisons, religion-neutral rules of general appli-
cability sometimes are applied to the detriment of churches or
religiously motivated activities of individuals. Most applications
of formally religion-neutral rules, however, simply make religion
more expensive than it would otherwise be. For example, compli-
ance by religious institutions with zoning codes and historic
preservation ordinances" has economic consequences. Other
33. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
53147 (1993). The Court decided Lukumi, in which Professor Laycock represented
the church in the Supreme Court, shortly before Congress enacted RFRA. Its an-
nounced principle was hardly a surprise; every member of the Supreme Court con-
curred in finding the Hialeah ordinances to be an antireligious gerrymander in viola-
tion of the Constitution. See id. at 523, 547.
34. See You Vang Yang v. Sturner, 750 F. Supp. 558, 560 (D.R.I. 1990) (rejecting
the claim that the Free Exercise Clause forbade an autopsy of young Hmong man
whose family's religious values were offended by an autopsy conducted under state
law).
35. See Flores Hearings, supra note 4 (statement of Jeffirey Sutton, Solicitor, State
of Ohio).
36. According to the Solicitor for the State of Ohio, almost 60% of the RFRA suits
in the LEXIS database involved prison inmates. See id. My own RFRA database,
discussed infra notes 48-74 and accompanying text, confirms the view of Mr. Sutton,
who presented the oral argument on behalf of the states in Flores.
37. Flores itself is an historic preservation case. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2160; see
also Grosz v. City of Miami Beach, 82 F.3d 1005, 1006 (11th Cir. 1996) (challenging
zoning ordinance); Keeler v. Mayor & City Council of Cumberland, 928 F. Supp. 591,
594-95 (D. Md. 1996) (challenging an historic preservation ordinance), motion to va-
cate denied, 951 F. Supp. 83 (D. Md. 1997); C.L.U.B. v. City of Chicago, No. 94-C-
6151, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2230, at *2-*6 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 26, 1996) (challenging
zoning laws).
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cases of the sort contemplated by RFRA involve genuine and
difficult conflicts between religious values and other important
social values, including most prominently nondiscrimination. 8
To be sure, a doctrine of religious exemptions can be justified
even in a world in which most harms resulting from the collision
of law and religion are not targeted at religion per se. In the ex-
ceptional case in which the impact of governmental action upon
religious conscience or community is severe and the government
interest in inflicting the harm is small, exemptions are highly
attractive as a matter of constitutional policy. Moreover, cases
involving this combination of severe impact upon religion and
weak justification for it will frequently involve minority religions,
less well-known and less popular than others. Elected politicians
will rarely be insensitive to mainstream religions, but they may
readily overlook the interests of other religious traditions.39
The authentic case for exemptions may well not have been
enough to persuade Congress to overturn the Smith decision by
statute; hence RFRA's supporters were compelled to exaggerate
the threat to religion presented by the regime of Smith. RFRA's
supporters overstated the case for the Act in other ways as well.
First, the Smith opinion had many seeds from which limiting
principles with real potency might have emerged. Smith distin-
guished prior free exercise cases on grounds that, over time,
might have ripened into reasonably religion-protective doctrines.
Smith's treatment of Wisconsin v. Yoder" as a case involving a
hybrid of religious rights and parental rights suggested a num-
ber of possibilities for creative lawyering on behalf of religion.
38. Several recent cases involve claims by religiously motivated landlords to be
exempt by force of RFRA from fair housing code restrictions on discriminating
against unmarried couples. See Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874
P.2d 274 (Alaska) (per curiam), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 979 (1994); Smith v. Fair Em-
ployment & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909 (Cal. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2531,
reh'g denied, 118 S. Ct. 20 (1997); see also Attorney General v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d
233 (Mass. 1994) (involving a similar claim under the Massachusetts Constitution).
39. I develop the general case for a judicial doctrine of free exercise exemptions
along the same lines as the paragraph above, but at greater length, in Ira C. Lupu,
To Control Faction and Protect Liberty: A General Theory of the Religion Clauses, 7
J. CoNTEMp. LEGAL IssuEs 357, 375-84 (1996).
40. 406 U.S. 205 (1972); see also Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881
(1990) (discussing Yoder).
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Most religious liberty claims involve religion plus some other
value of constitutional importance, including association and
speech. Further, Smith's discussion of administrative discretion
and individualized assessment as the contextual explanation of
Sherbert v. Verner4 and its progeny might have provided a
platform for the reconstruction of a healthy set of religion-pro-
tective principles.42 The speedy introduction and relatively
quick enactment of RFRA limited the possibilities of developing
those lines of reasoning in the lower courts.
Second, the pre-Smith law of free exercise had not been very
favorable to religion; nevertheless, RFRA's supporters acted as if
Smith were a sudden and fierce blow to an established body of
religion-favorable law. The Act's proponents persuaded Congress
that RFRA was designed to put the law of religious liberty back
to where it was immediately before Smith, but RFRA's provi-
sions in many respects went cosmically beyond the pre-Smith
law.43 That body of free exercise law had diluted the compelling
interest test and had refused to apply it to government-con-
trolled enclaves, including prisons and the military." RFRA
purported to restore the compelling interest standard in its full-
est and fiercest incarnation,45 and the Act eliminated any no-
tion that government enclaves were off-limits for religious liber-
ty claims.
46
The only element of pre-Smith law that RFRA tracked was
the requirement of a "substantial burden"47 as the trigger of
statutory protection. RFRA's supporters should have foreseen
that this codification of judge-made law replicated a serious
41. 374 U.S. 398 (1963); see also Smith, 494 U.S. at 883-84 (discussing Sherbert).
42. Professors Eisgruber and Sager charted a connection from Sherbert to a full-
blown and highly protective theory of "equal regard" for religion in Christopher L.
Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The Constitutional
Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. Cm. L. REv. 1245, 1282-301 (1994).
43. I develop the argument that RFRA purported to protect religion at a level
vastly increased over the legal status quo on Smith's eve in Lupu, supra note 13, at
191-98.
44. See id. at 180-85.
45. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (1994).
46. See id.; see also Lupu, supra note 13, at 191-93 (noting that RFRA applies to
government enclaves).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a).
1998]
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weakness in the extant doctrine on the subject. Indeed, RFRA's
dramatic overrestoration of the pre-Smith standard of review,
coupled with its adoption of the pre-Smith constraint that only a
substantial burden would trigger that heightened standard,
were among the factors contributing to RFRA's evisceration in
the lower courts.
The actual experience in those courts prior to Flores reveals a
most illuminating tale,48 although it is not one that RFRA's
strongest supporters appear to be in a hurry to tell. They are
probably embarrassed by how little RFRA accomplished, by
some of the claims made in its name, and by the costs RFRA
imposed on government, particularly in the administration of
prisons. For its principal drafters and congressional sponsors,
RFRA involved symbolic politics; they could be champions of
religious liberty from a safe distance, while others had to con-
front the competing values and interests case-by-case.
As of June 25, 1997, the date of the Mores decision, the state
and federal courts combined had granted or denied relief on the
merits of RFRA complaints in 168 cases.49 The federal courts
had decided 144 cases; the state courts had addressed twenty-
four.50 In cases in federal court challenging state prison poli-
cies, RFRA claimants were granted relief nine times and denied
relief eighty-five times. In nonprison cases tried in federal
courts, RFRA claimants were granted relief nine times and de-
48. I tell only a truncated version here. For a more elaborate presentation and
analysis of RFRA results in the lower courts, federal agencies, and state attorney
general opinions, see Ira C. Lupu, The Failure of RFRA, 20 U. ARK. LIrLE RocK L.
J. (forthcoming 1998) (manuscript at 19-26, on file with author). As that piece ex-
plains, the numbers that follow are based on a search of all decisions in the
Westlaw and LEXIS databases, between November 1993, and the date of the Flores
decision in June 1997, containing the search term "Religious Freedom Restoration
Act."
49. See id. at app. In a significant number (30-40) of other cases, the great major-
ity of which involve suits in federal court against state prison officials, appellate
courts remanded claims to trial courts for initial consideration or reconsideration of
RFRA claims. See, e.g., Hicks v. Garner, 69 F.3d 22 (5th Cir. 1995); Hinkle v. Arizo-
na Dep't of Corrections, 50 F.3d 14 (9th Cir. 1995). RFRA claimants therefore might
have prevailed in some of these cases. Their RFRA claims will now be dismissed in
light of Flores.
50. See Lupu, supra note 48 (manuscript at 24). All the information in the next
few paragraphs of this Essay is documented in the appendix of citations attached to
Lupu, supra note 48.
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nied relief forty-one times. In state courts, RFRA claimants were
granted relief in no cases and denied relief in five cases involv-
ing prisoner liberties, and were granted relief in seven cases and
denied relief in twelve nonprison cases. Together, these reported
decisions produced twenty-five grants of relief and 143 denials of
relief, for a RFRA win percentage of about fifteen percent.
To be sure, numbers can tell only a very partial story, and I
do not purport to analyze the data comprehensively in this
space. Nevertheless, the following qualitative comments seem
fitting.
Although the bulk of RFRA litigation involved prisoner claims,
RFRA accomplished very little inside or outside of the prison
context. In the important category of land use decisions, RFRA
claims tended to prevail only in those cases involving churches
engaged in providing food or shelter for the poor.5" In cases not
involving land use, RFRA victories include:
(1) In re Young,52 in which the Eighth Circuit held that tith-
ing to churches was insulated by RFRA from federal bankruptcy
law provisions that restrict transfers by insolvent debtors;
(2) Cheema v. Thompson," in which the Ninth Circuit upheld
a limited version of a right of Sikh Khalsa children to wear dag-
gers, required by their religious tradition, while in attendance at
public schools;
(3) United States v. Gonzalez,' in which a district court held
51. See Stuart Circle Parish v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 946 F. Supp. 1225, 1234-
41 (E.D. Va. 1996); Western Presbyterian Church v. Board of Zoning Adjustment,
862 F. Supp. 538, 547 (D.D.C. 1994) (granting permanent injunction); Western Pres-
byterian Church v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, 849 F. Supp. 77, 79 (D.D.C. 1994)
(granting preliminary injunction); Jesus Ctr. v. Farmington Hills Zoning Bd. of Ap-
peals, 544 N.W.2d 698, 703-05 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996).
52. 82 F.3d 1407 (8th Cir.), reh'g denied, 89 F.3d 494 (8th Cir. 1996), vacated sub
nom., Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church, 117 S. Ct. 2502 (1997); see also
In re Hodge, 200 B.R. 884, 894-99 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1996) (holding that avoidance
powers under the Bankruptcy Code did not comply with strict scrutiny required by
RFRA, but holding also that RFRA is unconstitutional).
53. 67 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. 1995); see also State v. Singh, No. C-950777, 1996 WL
741995, at *2-*4 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 31, 1996) (holding that the trial court erred by
failing to allow the defendant, a Sikh, to assert a violation of RFRA as a defense to
charges of carrying a concealed dagger).
54. 957 F. Supp. 1225 (D.N.M. 1997); see also Horen v. Commonwealth, 479
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that a Native American who killed a bald eagle was insulated by
RFRA from federal criminal conviction under endangered species
law;
(4) Hunt v. Hunt,55 in which the Vermont Supreme Court
held that RFRA insulated a father from a contempt citation for
refusing on religious grounds to make child support payments to
his child; and
(5) State v. Miller," in which the Wisconsin Supreme Court
held that RFRA exempted members of the Old Order Amish
from a requirement that they display a red and orange triangu-
lar emblem on their horse-drawn buggies.
The decisions involving bankruptcy, as well as those protect-
ing the desires of religious institutions to care for the poor, are
unpopular with chambers of commerce, but they are normatively
attractive to many who care about the well-being of churches."
For obvious reasons, however, RFRA supporters do not trumpet
the results in Cheema, Gonzalez, and Hunt; weapons-packing
schoolchildren, eagle killers, and recalcitrant child-support pay-
ers do not make attractive RFRA poster figures. Miller involved
everyone's favorite Old Order, but hardly presented matters of
deep religious magnitude.
Even more significantly, RFRA has not proven necessary to
protect religious freedom in a number of cases. Miller rests in
part on the Wisconsin Constitution.58 In several cases, RFRA
claims prevailed, but so did federal constitutional claims made
on the same facts.59 In other cases, state and federal constitu-
S.E.2d 553, 557-60 (Va. Ct. App. 1997) (reversing convictions of a Native American
couple for possession of owl feathers after holding that application of the criminal
statute failed the strict scrutiny test required by RFRA).
55. 648 A.2d 843 (Vt. 1994).
56. 538 N.W.2d 573 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995), affd, 549 N.W.2d 239 (Wis. 1996).
57. RFRA's most strident opponents are reluctant to discuss these decisions. My
experience has been that neither supporters nor opponents are entirely comfortable
with the RFRA record, and they all tend to ignore it.
58. See Miller, 538 N.W.2d at 578 (citing State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393,
397-99 (Minn. 1990) (upholding a similar claim by the Amish under the Minnesota
Constitution)).
59. See EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Powell v.
Stafford, 859 F. Supp. 1343 (D. Colo. 1994).
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tional claims prevailed when RFRA claims did not.6"
RFRA did portend a substantial change in the law governing
religious liberty in prisons. The pre-RFRA law was extremely
deferential to prison administrators,61 and RFRA signaled some
change in that posture.62 Prison administration can be extreme-
ly harsh on religious practice, and RFRA suits resulted in aban-
donment of some of the more weakly justified restrictions. In
particular, RFRA was instrumental in protecting prisoners'
rights to wear religious symbols" and to wear their hair in a
particular way for religious reasons." Nevertheless, prisoners
lost far more RFRA cases than they won, and state authorities
are on record as claiming that the costs of defending against
RFRA claims are prohibitive."
A chasm exists between the promise of RFRA and what it man-
aged to deliver. This gap arose from the interaction among RFRA's
elastic terms, the judicial discretion those terms create, and the
subject of religious exemptions generally. For some of the reasons
expressed in Smith-risks of anarchy, unprincipled distinctions,
religious favoritism, and comparing incommensurables-courts
60. For decisions upholding free exercise claims while rejecting RFRA claims, see
Keeler v. Mayor & City Council of Cumberland, 940 F. Supp. 879 (D. Md. 1996),
motion to vacate denied, 951 F. Supp. 83 (D. Md. 1997); Rader v. Johnston, 924 F.
Supp. 1540 (D. Neb. 1996); see also Attorney General v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233
(Mass. 1994) (holding that the state constitution may protect a landlord who wishes
for religious reasons to discriminate against unmarried cohabitants).
61. See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987) (holding that
prison regulations that conflict with prisoners' religious practices are enforceable so
long as regulations are "reasonably related to legitimate penological interests")
(citation omitted).
62. Precisely how much change is unclear. See the discussion of RFRA's legislative
history on the point in Lupu, supra note 13, at 191-93. A recent Note argues that
RFRA made little difference in prisons because most courts systematically underval-
ued prisoner claims and overvalued prison officials' responses. See Daniel J. Solove,
Note, Faith Profaned: The Religious Freedom Restoration Act and Religion in the
Prisons, 106 YALE L.J. 459, 474-86 (1996).
63. See, e.g., Sasnett v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d 1018, 1022-23 (7th Cir. 1996), vacated,
117 S. Ct. 2502 (1997); Campos v. Coughlin, 854 F. Supp. 194, 204-07 (S.D.N.Y.
1994).
64. See, e.g., Estep v. Dent, 914 F. Supp. 1462, 1467 (W.D. Ky. 1996); Lewis v.
Scott, 910 F. Supp. 282, 291 (E.D. Tex. 1995); Luckette v. Lewis, 883 F. Supp. 471,
479-83 (D. Ariz. 1995).
65. See Flores Hearings, supra note 4 (statement of Jeffrey Sutton, Solicitor, State
of Ohio).
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have long been deeply skeptical concerning such exemptions.
Quite rightly, judges see the warrant to grant such special treat-
ment as fraught with perils on both sides. Underprotecting reli-
gion presents free exercise problems; overprotecting it suggests
Establishment Clause concerns. Every move raises the danger of
discrimination among sects.
RFRA's terms maximized the possibilities for judicial manipu-
lation that a doctrine of free exercise exemptions inevitably in-
vites. RFRA had a seemingly high threshold for claims-the Act's
requirement of substantial burden on religious exercise'--and a
still more stringent standard by which the state had to justify
those practices that substantially burden religion.67 Knowing the
difficulty the state would face under that strict standard, judges
quickly realized that RFRA claims would almost always prevail
unless the burden threshold was set very high.
A quick tour of the RFRA case law reveals just how effectively
judges used the burden requirement to screen out RFRA claims.
A number of circuits adopted a requirement that RFRA protect-
ed only religious practices compelled by religious faith-i.e.,
RFRA was limited to matters of religious duty.68 Other courts,
quite correctly in my view, rejected this notion as too crabbed
and as inconsistent with the case law that Congress appeared to
incorporate by reference.69 These courts, however, also needed a
structure of limiting principles for what counted as a substantial
burden, lest every impact of every law on every aspect of human
behavior that might be motivated by religious conviction be sub-
ject to RFRA's stringent burden of justification. These limiting
66. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a) (1994).
67. See id. § 2000bb-l(b) (imposing tests of compelling interests and least re-
strictive means on state actions that substantially burden religion).
68. See, e.g., Goodall v. Stafford County Sch. Bd., 60 F.3d 168, 172-73 (4th Cir.
1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 706 (1996); Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1522 (11th
Cir. 1995). The Ninth Circuit was even more restrictive, requiring a showing of reli-
gious compulsion upon a practice central to the claimant's belief system. See Bryant
v. Gomez, 46 F.3d 948, 949 (9th Cir. 1995). For a discussion of the range of inter-
pretations given to RFRA's substantial burden requirement, see Steven C. Seeger,
Note, Restoring Rights to Rites: The Religious Motivation Test and the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1472 (1997).
69. See, e.g., Sasnett v. Sullivan, 908 F. Supp. 1429, 1443-44 (W.D. Wis. 1995),
affd, 91 F.3d 1018 (7th Cir. 1996), vacated, 117 S. Ct. 2502 (1997).
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principles took a variety of forms, including a focus on 1) wheth-
er the practice motivated by religion was central to the
claimant's religious beliefs,70 2) the degree of coercion involved
in the state's policy,7' and 3) whether the claimant had nonreli-
gious means for avoiding the burden.72
Even under the most generous and flexible approaches, courts
retained substantial discretion to reject claims as involving in-
sufficient burdens on religion.7" Perhaps the Supreme Court
would eventually have unified the prevailing understanding of
this question under a coherent and uniform standard capable of
consistent and principled application. Unless and until that hap-
pened, however, the disposition of RFRA claims would continue
to be anything but predictable. Given the conventional judicial
bias against 'exemptions, the pattern of judicial decision
unsurprisingly reveals that RFRA victories were scarce indeed.
What, then, is lost by the invalidation of RFRA? Occasionally
a sympathetic religious exemption claim that might have pre-
vailed under RFRA will be rejected when advanced under other
legal theories. This loss is a cause for concern, but not for the
wailing that followed the decision in Fores. Flores eliminates
the costs of defending RFRA claims against state and local gov-
ernment, and the antireligious resentment and skepticism that
such claims may have fueled. In the meantime, religious liberty
remains safeguarded by current constitutional law, with its
immanent-and perhaps imminent--possibilities for improve-
70. See Mack v. O'Leary, 80 F.3d 1175, 1179 (7th Cir. 1996). Attempting to syn-
thesize the law of burdens, Judge Posner wrote in Mack:
[A] substantial burden on the free exercise of religion, within the mean-
ing of the Act, is one that forces adherents of a religion to refrain from
religiously motivated conduct, inhibits or constrains conduct or expression
that manifests a central tenet of a person's religious beliefs, or compels
conduct or expression that is contrary to those beliefs.
Id.
71. See id.
72. See Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909, 923-29 (Cal.
1996) (holding that the owner of a small apartment building is not substantially
burdened within the meaning of RFRA by a requirement to rent to an unmarried
couple because the landlord is free to move capital from the ownership of residential
apartments to some other enterprise), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2531, reh'g denied, 118
S. Ct. 20 (1997).
73. See supra notes 69-72.
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ment. Moreover, in cases in which the equities on religion's side
are strong, state constitutional law of religious liberty may be-
come reinvigorated.74 Over time, I expect that RFRA's disap-
pearance will leave religious liberty in no worse, and perhaps
better, condition than RFRA would have produced.
III. FLORES AND CONSTITUTIONAL FUNDAMENTALS
As Marci Hamilton said in the opening sentence of her oral
argument to the Supreme Court in Flores,75 the case was about
federal power rather than religious liberty. The dispositive issue
in the dispute concerned congressional power to impose upon the
states what is, under current law, a nonconstitutionally mandat-
ed version of religious liberty. The case was not centrally about
the two other major threads of Professor Hamilton's argu-
ment-pure separation of powers and nonestablishment. The
Court in Flores did not reach either of those questions.7" Conse-
quently, RFRA remains in effect against the federal government
unless and until the courts decide at least one of these issues
unfavorably to the United States.77
74. This reinvigoration began in the wake of Smith, see Angela C. Carmella, State
Constitutional Protection of Religious Exercise: An Emerging Post-Smith Jurispru-
dence, 1993 BYU L. REV. 275, but the enactment of RFRA tended to short-circuit
that process.
75. See Oral Argument of Marci A. Hamilton on Behalf of the Petitioner, 1997 WL
87109, at *3 (Feb. 19, 1997) (No. 95-2074), City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157
(1997).
76. Concurring in Flores with a brief opinion, Justice Stevens advanced the view
that RFRA violated the Establishment Clause because it preferred religion and reli-
gious institutions to their secular counterparts. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2172
(Stevens, J., concurring). No other Justice addressed that question. The Court's opin-
ion alluded to separation-of-powers concerns in its analysis of Section 5, but did not
directly confront the question. See id. at 2162-68. Professor Hamilton firmly believes
that RFRA is unconstitutional as applied to the federal government. See Marci A.
Hamilton, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act is Unconstitutional, Period 1 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. (forthcoming 1998)
77. Immediately after the Flores decision, the Court vacated and remanded the
Eighth Circuit's decision in In re Young, 82 F.3d 1407 (8th Cir. 1996). See Chris-
tians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church, 117 S. Ct. 2502 (1997). In Young, the
Eighth Circuit held RFRA to operate as a limitation on the ability of creditors to
have contributions to churches by insolvent debtors set aside under federal bankrupt-
cy law. See Young, 82 F.3d at 1409-10. The Supreme Court's disposition suggests
that the validity of RFRA against the federal government remains an open question.
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I will explore briefly those two questions prior to turning to
the matter of Section 5. To my mind, the nonestablishment ar-
gument poses the more serious of the two unresolved objections
to RFRA. Accommodations of religion and religion alone have
not fared well in the Supreme Court. They have been upheld
only in Zorach v. Clauson 8 decided over forty years ago and
inconsistent with much that has been decided thereafter, and
Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 9 involving an ex-
emption of religious organizations from the federal ban on reli-
gious discrimination in employment. The accommodation upheld
in Amos was at least in part required by the Free Exercise
Clause (as then construed) and arguably served to equalize reli-
gious entities with nonreligious entities that face no comparable
statutory impediment to hiring those with ideological loyalty. In
contrast, the Supreme Court has struck down a sect-specific ac-
commodation in Board of Education v. Grumet,0  a
Sabbatarian-specific accommodation in Estate of Thornton v.
Caldor, Inc.,"1 and, most damning for RFRA, a generic accom-
modation for religion in Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 2 in
which the Court invalidated an exemption for religious materials
from a state's sales tax.
Whether RFRA, as applied to the federal government, will fall
on the Amos side or the Texas Monthly side of current accommo-
dation doctrine is a close question. RFRA does not discriminate
among religions-but it most certainly favors religion over its
secular analogues. Moreover, the burdens it relieves cannot be
viewed, under current law, as constitutionally onerous or as
more severe than those faced by secular causes or institutions.
My own view is that RFRA, as applied to the federal govern-
ment, should be saved by limiting it to matters of personal con-
science and by extending its protection to concerns of secular
conscience as well.'
78. 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (upholding program of released time from public school
day for religious instruction and no other purpose).
79. 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
80. 512 U.S. 687 (1994).
81. 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
82. 489 U.S. 1 (1989).
83. The Court has taken this route before when analogous Establishment Clause
1998] 809
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
Of course, the nonestablishment problem is of no concern if
RFRA is unconstitutional on the ground that the Act involved
Congress and the President in a forbidden overruling of a Su-
preme Court decision on a question of constitutional law.' Able
commentators have taken this view,' but I find it ultimately
unpersuasive. RFRA as applied to the federal government does
not rest on Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Rather, it
rests in each possible application to federal law on whatever
power authorizes Congress to act in that context. If Congress is
empowered to create prisons, as surely it is, then Congress may
accommodate religion in those prisons beyond what the Free
Exercise Clause requires-up to the limit of what the Establish-
ment Clause forbids. Congress may regulate the federal govern-
ment more broadly than it regulates state government-in this
context, more broadly than the substantive rights protected by
the First Amendment. RFRA as applied to the federal govern-
ment, therefore, does not threaten the Court's Marbury function
in the manner suggested by RFRA as applied to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment's enforcement power.
All of this analysis concerns matters as yet undecided. The
issue that Flores did resolve, however, warrants its own intense
focus. For the past thirty years, scholars have argued about the
scope of congressional power to enforce the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. In particular, the decision in Katzenbach v. Morgan'
questions about federal statutory law have arisen. See Welsh v. United States, 398
U.S. 333, 343-44 (1970) (extending conscientious objector provision to a claimant with
nonreligious objections to war). Justice Harlan's concurring opinion, necessary to the
outcome, argued explicitly that the Establishment Clause forbade a legislative prefer-
ence for religious over nonreligious conscience. See id. at 356 (Harlan, J., concur-
ring). For a thorough discussion of the relevance of Welsh to RFRA, see Marshall,
supra note 20, at 229-35.
84. This theory, sounding in separation of powers, is narrower than the Establish-
ment Clause ground for invalidating RFRA as applied to the federal government,
because the Establishment Clause ground would have consequences for state legis-
lation as well. Cf Plaut v. Spendthrift Farms, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 217 (1995) (stating
that separation of powers is a narrower ground than due process, because the latter,
unlike the former, "might dictate a similar result in a challenge to state legislation
under the Fourteenth Amendment").
85. See, e.g., Brant, supra note 22; Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 23; Gressman
& Carmella, supra note 26; Hamilton, supra note 76.
86. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
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suggested the possibility of virtually unlimited legislative power
to revise and expand judge-made constitutional law. Many of the
voices raised against that view addressed the risk that Congress
would roll back constitutional rights rather than expand
them. 7 In the immediate wake of Katzenbach, the threat to the
states associated with rights expansion pursuant to Section 5 re-
ceived scant attention.
Times and concerns have changed. Rights dilution is less a
worry than it once was, and encroachment on the states has be-
come a dominant theme in constitutional law. I believe this lat-
ter concern represents a restoration of fundamentals as well as a
reaction to the singularity of the rights paradigm that centrally
occupied the Warren Court.
Of our earliest constitutional decisions, Marbury v. Madi-
son' and McCulloch v. Maryland"5 established the most dura-
ble and significant building blocks of the constitutional law to
follow. Indeed, these germinal and sweeping opinions of Chief
Justice Marshall remain firmly and deeply entrenched in the
constitutional discourse and opinion writing fashions of our own
time. To the Court, Marbury continues to represent judicial su-
premacy in interpretation of the Constitution," and the Court
repeatedly invokes McCulloch's expansive methodology9' for de-
termining the contemporary scope of implied congressional pow-
er." For most of the life of the Republic, McCulloch has been
87. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 204-05 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). For examples of commentary, see Jesse H. Choper,
Congressional Power to Expand Judicial Definitions of the Substantive Terms of the
Civil War Amendments, 67 MINN. L. REv. 299 (1982); Samuel Estreicher, Congressio-
nal Power and Constitutional Rights: Reflections on Proposed 'Human Life" Legis.
lation, 68 VA. L. REV. 333 (1982).
88. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
89. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
90. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2172 (1997); United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974) ("We therefore reaffirm that it is the province and
duty of this Court 'to say what the law is' with respect to the claim of privilege pre-
sented in this case.") (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177).
91. "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and
all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are
not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitu-
tional." McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421.
92. See, e.g., City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 175-78 (1980);
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 649-51 (1966).
1998] 811
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
the official translation of the Necessary and Proper Clause.3
Although both reinforce strong national institutions, the
Marbury function and the McCulloch standards have always been
in quiet tension with one another. Marbury declares that the
Court has the power to determine the meaning of the Constitu-
tion as law. McCulloch declares that the Congress, not the Court,
possesses enormous discretion to choose the means necessary to
bring about the ends entrusted to the Congress by the Constitu-
tion. Marbury licenses the Court; McCulloch charters the Con-
gress. McCulloch deference softens the Court's Marbury grip.
From 1937 until the recent explosion of pro-state federalism
decisions, most scholars accepted the supremacy of the
McCulloch principle in questions concerning the scope of con-
gressional power. Only congressional authority to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment has given these commentators pause.94
Ever since the resurrection of substantive due process and the
Supreme Court's expansion of the constitutional idea of equality,
there has lurked the possibility that Congress could become
what the Court has refused to be-a "perpetual censor upon all
legislation of the States."95 The amendment is sufficiently broad
in its language and historical meaning that it puts virtually no
subject off legislative limits for Congress. Even if the enforce-
ment power were a one-way ratchet, permitting only the expan-
sion of rights, a power so broad would end the concept of a Con-
gress limited in its coercive authority to textually designated
subjects of national significance-commerce, intellectual proper-
ty, bankruptcy, national defense, etc.
Moreover, a broad reading of Section 5-the type of reading
suggested by McCulloch, representing maximum elasticity of
implied power-is in stark tension with the Court's Marbury
function. When Congress legislates broadly to prevent what it
perceives as violations of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, it strikes at the Court's dominance in law declaration as
93. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (vesting Congress with the power to "make all
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing
Powers").
94. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
95. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 78 (1872).
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well as at autonomy of state operations."
Flores illustrates strikingly a synthesis of Marbury and
McCulloch that preserves the Court's own institutional position
as well as state authority. Marbury represents the thesis of judi-
cial power over the Constitution; the Court declares the meaning
of the fundamental law. McCulloch represents the antithesis of
judicial power; Congress selects the means for achieving the
ends entrusted to it, and the "degree of ... necessity" of those
means is for Congress to decide.9" In the context of Section 5,
the antithesis threatens to overwhelm the thesis of judicial su-
premacy in law declaration announced by Marbury. Hence, the
synthesis that controls Section 5 cases melds the Marbury func-
tion of law declaration with the means-selecting authority in
Congress ratified by McCulloch. Implicit in Flores is a general
test for the validity of exercises of Section 5 power-whether,
given judicially developed norms for what constitutes a state
violation of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress's
choice of a scheme to prevent or remedy such violations is a rea-
sonable one.
This institutionally synthetic approach explains the voting
rights cases, in which Congress built upon judicially articulated
norms in fashioning remedial schemes that courts refused to cre-
ate out of the Constitution alone.98 These schemes, grounded
upon and made reasonable by congressional fact-finding, repre-
sent legislatively approved ways of achieving judicially identified
constitutional ends-in particular, racial equality in the distri-
bution of access to political power and protection of racial minor-
ities in the distribution of government services.
From the outset, RFRA clearly could not satisfy such a review
standard. Employment Division v. Smith99 stated, and Church
of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah' restated,
the judicially developed norms for measuring violations of the
Free Exercise Clause that are incorporated into the Fourteenth
96. See supra notes 90-95 and accompanying text.
97. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 422 (1819).
98. For the fullest and best explication of this point, see Conkle, supra note 18, at
42-55.
99. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
100. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
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Amendment and applied to the states.'0 ' These norms explicit-
ly require a demonstration of intent to harm religion, rather
than simple impact on religion, to make out a violation of the
Constitution. 2 Because RFRA went so far beyond the consti-
tutional norm, its substantive standard was grossly unreason-
able as a method of preventing violations of the norm. Congress
made no findings that might have rendered RFRA reasonable in
light of that norm, and findings of that sort would have been
virtually incredible. Only on extremely rare occasions will reli-
gion-neutral, generally applicable laws be covertly aimed at reli-
gious practice, because the requirements of neutrality and gen-
erality will require lawmakers to burden others-politically
popular religion and its secular counterparts-in the effort to
burden the covertly targeted religion.
This synthesis of the competing principles of Marbury and
McCulloch is at the heart of Flores's requirements of congruence
and proportionality between the means employed by Congress in
RFRA and the ends entrusted to Congress by Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Time and again the Fores opinion re-
turns to this theme:
While preventive rules are sometimes appropriate remedial
measures, there must be a congruence between the means
used and the ends to be achieved."°'
... RFRA is so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or
preventive object that it cannot be understood as responsive
to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior."°
The stringent test RFRA demands of state laws reflects a
lack of proportionality or congruence between the means
101. See id. at 531-33.
102. See id. at 532-33; Smith, 494 U.S. at 876-82.
103. City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2169 (1997).
104. Id. at 2170.
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adopted and the legitimate end to be achieved." s
It is for Congress in the first instance to 'determin[e] ...
what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the
Fourteenth Amendment,' and its conclusions are entitled to
much deference. [Katzenbach v. Morgan].... [Nevertheless,]
the courts retain the power, as they have since Marbury v.
Madison, to determine if Congress has exceeded its authori-
ty .... RFRA contradicts vital principles necessary to main-
tain separation of powers and the federal balance."°
Of course, a rigorous requirement of congruence, if applied to
all grants of congressional power, would be truly revolutionary.
Proportionality is a matter of degree, while congruence is a mat-
ter of one-to-one correspondence. A national bank presumably
was not congruent with the federal ends McCulloch says it
might help attain because the bank may have engaged in busi-
ness disconnected from federal objectives. Similarly, forbidding
all loansharking is not congruent with federal ends of protecting
interstate commerce from organized crime because some loan
sharks may have no connection to organized crime or any other
phenomenon of interstate significance. 7 McCulloch itself says
that once a measure is viewed as necessary, the degree of its ne-
cessity is to be measured "in another place"'0 --i.e., Congress.
Does Flores's invocation of congruence therefore suggest a con-
striction on the vastness of implied federal power?
Although such a radical cutback in federal legislative power
(and corresponding radical expansion of federal judicial power) is
possible, surely much narrower readings of Flores exist and in-
volve less tension with our developed constitutional tradition.
First, Section 5 power can be and is measured against a judicial-
ly developed baseline of Section 1 rights. Judicial measurement
105. Id. at 2171.
106. I& at 2172 (quoting Katzenbach v. Morgan 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966)).
107. See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154-55 (1971) (upholding, under the
Commerce Clause, a federal prohibition of all extortionate credit transactions).
108. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 423 (1819).
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ment of the degree of nonproportionality in Section 5 cases is
institutionally more appropriate than comparable measurement
under the Article I powers of Congress,"' such as the Com-
merce Clause. Although Section 5 cases include an empirical
component-what is reasonably necessary to prevent or remedy
violations of Section 1-Commerce Clause cases far more fre-
quently require measurement against an empirical standard of
substantial effects on interstate commerce. Accordingly, one
would expect courts to be more assertive in determining the
scope of Section 5 power than in ascertaining the scope of the
Commerce Clause. Judgments of reasonableness, conducted
against a purely legal baseline of judicial norms, strain the
Court's institutional competence far less than calculations of
interstate economic consequences of legislative policies."'
A final glance at McCulloch suggests yet another way to
characterize Flores as representing a rich return to constitu-
tional fundamentals. Recall that Chief Justice Marshall in
McCulloch asserted that
[Slhould congress, under the pretext of executing its pow-
ers, pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not in-
trusted to the government; it would become the painful
duty of this tribunal, should a case requiring such a deci-
109. When states are the regulatory target, congressional power to enforce federal
norms is greater under Section 5 than the Commerce Power or other Article I pow-
ers. Compare Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (holding that Congress may
abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to Section 5), with Seminole Tribe v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding that Congress may not abrogate state sovereign
immunity pursuant to its Article I powers). If Seminole Tribe is to have any bite,
there must be real limits imposed on the Section 5 power.
110. Moreover, when one recalls that Section 5 power exercises are aimed typically
at states qua states in their governance activities, it is not difficult to see Flores as
a first cousin of the state sovereignty principle of New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144 (1992) (declaring unconstitutional the take-title provision of the Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, which required states to claim
ownership and liability for in-state radioactive waste if the state missed statutory
deadlines for implementing disposal plans), a principle recently reaffirmed in Printz
v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997) (holding that the Brady Handgun Violence
Prevention Act provision requiring states to conduct background checks on gun pur-
chasers until a national system is operative exceeds Congress's authority under the
Necessary and Proper Clause of the Constitution). New York and Printz remain an
obstacle to any attempt to reframe and relegislate RFRA as an exercise of the com-
merce power.
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sion come before it, to say, that such an act was not the
law of the land."'
The pretext dictum of McCulloch has long been ignored, pri-
marily because of the institutional difficulties of enforcing it.
How is it to be demonstrated, for example, that the civil rights
acts or the federal labor laws are pretextual exercises of the
commerce power?
In Section 5 cases, by contrast, the Court's own opinions pro-
vide the controlling measure of what objects are entrusted to
Congress. RFRA quite evidently manifested discontent with
those decisions, rather than any desire to remedy or prevent
substantive violations of the Constitution as the Court under-
stood it. Congress thus designed RFRA to accomplish an object,
which, in the Court's view, the Constitution did not entrust to
the federal government in its regulation of the states."2 The
claim that RFRA rested on Section 5 was a transparent pretext,
and the Court, understandably bent on protecting its own pre-
rogatives".3 as well as those of the states, treated it according-
ly." 4 This judicial handling of RFRA represents institutional
self-interest, zealous exercise of authority in deciding the mean-
ing of the Constitution in justiciable matters, and institutional
ambition counteracting the same."5 Constitutional dynamics
more fundamental than these are, like good men and women,
hard to find.
111. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 423.
112. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2168-72 (1997).
113. I offer this as an institutional observation, not as a defense of judicial suprem-
acy in interpretation of the Constitution. For the latter, see Larry Alexander &
Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV.
1359 (1997); for sharply opposing views, see Michael W. McConnell, The Supreme
Court 1996 Term-Comment: Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of
Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARv. L. REV. 153 (1997); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most
Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217
(1994). I expect all three branches to aggressively assert their own view of the Con-
stitution, as their institutional interests dictate. Because courts had to interpret and
apply RFRA, the Act implicated judicial branch interests most sharply.
114. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2172.
115. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (arguing that power separation will protect constitutional values because the
institutional ambition of one branch will counteract the ambition of others).
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